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ABSTRACT 
Normative solutions for the successful recovery from large-scale disasters have been presented by various 
research, but implementation requires a long process, and a mechanism for the process to continue is necessary. 
We consider the consistency among strategies of stakeholders such as government and NGOs. These players 
make decisions based on not only direct motives but various complex motives and interaction with other players. 
This paper considers interactive decision making as a game among stakeholders. As a case study, we analyze 
housing reconstruction project in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. There was relatively abundant 
financial support, but the recovery process did not work in a desirable direction. Regarding two important decisions 
defining the result of recovery, stakeholders’ possible decisions are evaluated and, by using game theoretic 
approach, the reason of poor output and the conditions to shift the equilibrium to the one suitable for the long-term 
goal of recovery are discussed. These analyses showed that motive compatibility among stakeholders should be 
considered when designing a recovery process for severe disasters. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Various recovery players including the government, 
affected people, NGOs, etc., share the common 
objective in recovery, but at the same time, they have 
a respective objective and motive (Bosher, 2011; 
Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2009; Werker, 2010). Each 
player’s decision is dependent on not only their 
complex motives but also other players’ decisions 
(Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2009). Therefore, the 
recovery process can be understood as the result of 
interaction among players who choose the best 
strategy to achieve their objectives. Because long-
term recovery outcomes are accumulated results of 
several phases in which various players’ decisions 
are involved, it is needed for achieving intended 
recovery goals to understand players’ complex 
motives and interaction among players (Amaratunga 
& Haigh, 2011). While past research has addressed 
several dimensions of sustainable recovery, the 
research has not clarified how sustainable recovery 
can be achieved in terms of players’ motives 
(Joakim, 2013; Blaikie, 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2006). 
Research on recovery players’ motives and 
interaction is still in the beginning stages. In terms of 
short-term recovery, Coles and Zhuang (2011) 
analyzed interactions between international and local 
players for relief resource utilization using game 
theory. Regarding long-term recovery, Keraminiyage 
(2011) evaluated the applicability of game theory 
concepts to housing reconstruction. However, the 
concrete analysis methodology was not suggested. 
This research aims to present analysis framework for 
the long-term recovery process in terms of 
stakeholders' motives and their conflicts in interactive 
decision-making processes. For achieving expected 
outcomes, important decisions in the recovery 
process should be consistent with long-term goals. 
However, some decisions are distorted by complex 
motives or interaction among players. To guide such 
shortsighted decisions into the desirable decision, it 
is necessary to analyze related players’ motives and 
their interactions. Based on the understanding of 
causes, the conditions of compatible decisions with 
desirable long-term goals will be suggested with a 
motive-based approach. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
As the subject of analysis, decisions in long-term 
recovery processes are selected on the basis of 
negative influences on final recovery outcomes. In 
regard to the main player of the decision and the 
involved player, complex motives and related goals 
are defined by a literature review. The priority order of 
motives is determined based on contexts. For the 
literature review, related research, reports by players, 
news, and survey results were reviewed. The result 
of research on the general tendencies in the motives 
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of recovery players are also considered because 
sometimes unspecified motives in players’ reports or 
interviews can play an important role in decision 
making. 
To establish the direct cause of the decisions, the 
interactive decision-making process among recovery 
players is analyzed as a game of players pursuing 
the best strategy. According to each player, the 
preference for possible decisions can be evaluated 
with priority order in motives. This this preference 
information is applied to the analysis of interactive 
decisions among players. Finally, the conditions for 
shifting decisions from the actual decision to the 
desirable and motive-compatible direction are 
suggested. 
3. HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION IN SRI LANKA 
AFTER THE 2004 TSUNAMI 
As a case study, the recovery process of Sri Lanka 
after the 2004 Tsunami was considered. On 
December 26, 2004, an earthquake of magnitude 9.0 
occurred off the Sumatran Coast, triggering a 
tsunami of unprecedented proportions. In Sri Lanka, 
the tsunami caused severe impacts including 35,322 
people killed and 516,150 internally displaced people 
(Government of Sri Lanka & Development Partners, 
2005). Because 26% of the population lived within 
one mile of the coast, damage in housing was severe 
(World Bank, 2005). There were 99,480 homes 
completely destroyed and 44,290 partially damaged, 
together comprising some 13% of homes in the 
affected districts (Lyons, 2009). 
Largely as an outcome of the global media attention, 
“one of the largest relief and rehabilitation operations 
ever launched by humanitarian organizations around 
the world” became implemented in Sri Lanka (Rawal 
et al., 2005 as cited in Silva, 2009). The Sri Lankan 
government adopted two types of reconstruction 
programs for housing, the Donor Assisted Program 
for relocating houses and the Owner Driven Program 
for houses in situ. The Sri Lankan government was 
able to begin relocating 30,602 houses by external 
agencies with funds (Reconstruction and 
Development Agency [RADA], 2006). 
While participation of INGOs in housing bridged the 
gap between required recovery resource and the 
limited capacity of the Sri Lankan government, as a 
result of long process, housing reconstruction by 
INGOs did not achieve much success. Housing 
construction by INGOs was much slower than the 
Owner Driven Program (RADA, 2006). 
Nonoccupation of new houses by tsunami victims 
reached 37% in Hambantota (Barenstein & 
Wickramagamage, 2009). 
3.1. Decisions Hindered Recovery Outcomes 
In this research, only relocation projects implemented 
by INGOs were considered because they reveal 
interactive relations between players during the 
recovery process. Based on the literature review, two 
main decisions that resulted in slow progress and a 
smaller number of constructed houses than expected 
are defined. 
The first decision was the government's failure of 
relocation policy. The Sri Lankan government's failure 
of having a relocation policy at the initial planning 
phase of housing reconstruction resulted in negative 
impacts on the overall recovery process even after 
revision (Ingram, Franco, Rio, & Khazai, 2006). The 
Sri Lankan government introduced a uniform 
distance (100 m in the West and South and 200 m in 
the North and East) buffer zone quickly (Silva, 2009). 
The buffer zone policy incited massive relocation of 
people and had negative impacts on recovery. For 
instance, lack of consultation with people worsened 
livelihood conditions in the relocation site and 
resulted in a low occupancy rate after construction. 
The other decision was the NGOs’ temporary or 
permanent withdrawal during reconstruction 
implementation. This withdrawal resulted in a limited 
outcome in housing reconstruction as well. There 
were 65,000 pledges for donor driven made, but only 
18% had been completed two years after the disaster 
(Ratnasooriya, Samarawickrama, & Imamura, 2007) 
Fulfillment of aid in housing below the initial plan 
induced the inevitable revisions of plans and became 
the reason of delayed housing recovery. Delay of the 
reconstruction schedule also induced low occupancy 
of new houses. 
3.2. Involved Players in Decisions 
As involved players with these two decisions, two 
players are defined: the Sri Lankan government and 
INGOs. In terms of the first decision, the 
government’s initial relocation policy, INGOs that 
have a key part in implementation of housing 
relocation should be considered. It is about the same 
for the second decision, because the INGOs’ 
decision to withdrawal is closely related to the 
government’s policy revision. The government and 
INGOs are in interdependent relations in housing 
relocation projects. 
4. ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS: RELOCATION 
PLAN 
As the first step for analysis of the government’s 
decision on relocation policy at the initial planning 
phase, involved players’ motives and related goals 
were defined by a literature review. 
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4.1. Motives and Related Goals  
4.1.1. Government of Sri Lanka 
 
For the Sri Lankan government, the most direct 
motive for relocation was matching electorates’ 
expectations. Political consideration influenced 
composition of disaster management organizations 
as well as relief resource distribution (Boano, 2009; 
Silva, 2009). Hasty relocation planning can be 
understood by the motive to show people the ability 
to control a chaotic situation. 
The second motive in the relocation plan was 
vulnerability reduction. To cope with unregulated 
development on the coast, the government tried to 
introduce regulation policies since 1981 (Birkmann 
et al., 2010), but implementation was not 
successful. Repeated failure motivated the 
government to address the chronic problem of 
unplanned development (Mulligan & Shaw, 2007). 
However, because of the lack of experience in 
massive relocation or reconstruction, the 
government focused on only risk exposure 
reduction (Jayawardane, 2006). 
Thirdly, effective resource utilization was another 
motive in decisions because of limited recovery 
budgets. However, relocation policy was 
inconsistent with this motive because of expensive 
budgets. When it is considered that the total loss 
from the disaster was up to 4.5% of GDP, an 
adaptation of the relocation plan shows that the 
government put two other motives before resource 
effectiveness (Lyons, 2009). Because the 
government put a political factor before actual 
damage distribution in relief resource distribution, it 
can be considered that the government places a 
high priority on matching electorates’ expectations. 
The priority among motives of the government can 
be defined, in order, as: matching electorates’ 
expectations, vulnerability reduction, and effective 
resource utilization. 
4.1.2. International NGOs 
The Sri Lankan government’s relocation plan could 
be implemented only with support of INGOs. 
Therefore, for analysis of the government’s 
relocation decision, INGOs’ decision to participate in 
relocation should be analyzed as well. 
Like the government, INGOs aim for vulnerability 
reduction, but INGOs’ goals are focused on 
supporting the most vulnerable people (International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies [IFRC], 2008). For instance, the 
government’s initial housing policy, which gave one 
house for one destroyed house without 
consideration of the number of owned houses, did 
correspond with the INGOs’ goals (Vaes & 
Goddeeris, 2012). So additional assessment on 
beneficiaries was applied by INGOs. Therefore, the 
government’s relocation policy was not consistent 
with INGOs’ goals. 
INGOs also consider effective resource utilization 
as a main motive. To maximize the impact of a 
limited budget, for example, International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
tried to improve the design by feedback from 
community meeting (IFRC, 2007). In comparison 
with the motive to reduce vulnerability, INGOs put 
vulnerability reduction above it. Such priority was 
revealed at the soil tests of the Belgian Red Cross 
because they were conducted only to show the 
capability and willingness to undertake relocation 
work for the government despite a waste of budget. 
On this criterion in effectiveness, uniform distance 
relocation was not preferred for a minimum 
relocation plan. 
In spite of these contrary motives, INGOs undertook 
construction in relocation to meet another motive, 
matching donors’ expectations. For INGOs, 
disasters have become an important opportunity for 
fundraising, and participation in disaster work is 
crucial to profiles (Lyons, 2009). Therefore, INGOs 
felt pressure to show their capabilities of doing 
projects (IFRC, 2007). 
The priority among motives of INGOs can be 
defined, in order as: matching donors’ expectations, 
vulnerability reduction, and effective resource 
utilization. 
4.2. Analysis of Interactive Decisions  
4.2.1. Evaluation of Possible Decisions 
 
INGOs joined the government’s relocation plan with 
the uniform distance buffer zone. However, it was 
an incompatible decision with INGOs’ vulnerability 
reduction motive. To meet that motive, it can be 
considered as a possible option that INGOs asked 
the government to develop detailed criteria for 
relocation even if it takes time. Four possible 
decision sets can be considered like below. 
Decision set: (Sri Lankan Government, INGO) 
1. (Uniform distance relocation plan, Join in ) 
2. (Uniform distance relocation plan, Not join) 
3. (Minimum distance relocation plan, Join in )  
4. (Minimum distance relocation plan, Not join) 
According to the Sri Lankan government’s motives, 
each decision set can be evaluated. First of all, in 
terms  of  matching  electorates’  expectations,  two  
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Figure 1. Extensive form game in decisions on relocation plan 
goals can be defined as “quick response for 
showing situation control” and “capability to proceed 
recovery continuously based on ‘quick response,’” 
preference are decided as (a)=(b)>(c)=(d). 
According to “capability to proceed recovery,” 
preference can be defined as (a)=(c)>(b)=(d). 
Secondly, regarding vulnerability reduction 
especially in the risk exposure reduction goal, the 
order of decisions is decided as (a)=(b)>(c)=(d). 
Thirdly, for effective resource utilization, preference 
is decided as (a)=(c)>(b)=(d). After considering all 
the factors, the government’s preference order of 
decision sets is decided as (a)>(c)>(b)>(d). 
INGOs’ preference can be decided as same 
manner. For matching donors’ expectations focusing 
on undertake recovery work, preference is decided 
as (a)=(c)>(b)=(d). Secondly, according to effective 
resource utilization focusing budget investment, 
preference is (c)>(b)=(d)>(a). Finally, for 
vulnerability reduction focusing on helping the most 
vulnerable people, the order is decided as 
(c)>(a)>(d)=(b). Taken together, INGOs’ preference 
is in order of (c)>(a)>(b)=(d). 
4.2.2. Analysis of Strategies 
The government and INGOs sequentially made 
decisions for housing reconstruction at relocation 
sites. This relationship can be represented by 
extensive form game between two players like 
Figure 1. In this figure, preference was represented 
as amount of payoff. Payoff number shows only 
order among options. 
For INGOs, the decision to join the relocation 
became the dominant strategy that gives higher 
payoff than not to join, regardless of the 
government’s decision. The government can 
maximize payoff by selecting the uniform distance 
relocation plan. However, each player’s reasonable 
decision (a) resulted in negative impact on long-
term recovery by introducing an inappropriate policy 
without enough consultation with people in a hurry. 
In the viewpoint of long-term vulnerability reduction, 
the decision set (c) is the most desirable case. 
 
4.2.3. Conditions to Shift Decisions 
First of all, for shifting actual decisions to the 
desirable one, much research suggested normative 
solutions to change motive or related goals directly 
related to decisions (Ingram et al., 2006; Coles & 
Zhuang, 2011). Regarding the Sri Lankan 
government’s decision on relocation, policymaker’s 
recognition that forced relocation should be 
minimized by consultation with people, which can 
be one of the normative solutions. Such recognition 
can change only the motive of vulnerability reduction 
and is not enough to change the decision because 
the strongest motive to match electorates’ 
expectations will not be changed. 
On the other hand, in terms of interaction among 
players, the desirable decision set is same with the 
decision of maximum payoff for INGOs. If INGOs 
tried to increase their own payoff by threating the 
government to select a minimum distance relocation 
policy, INGOs could change the government’s 
decision because of budget dependence on INGOs. 
The reason why threats could not be made was 
because of competition among INGOs for 
undertaking recovery work. According to UN-Habitat 
(2011), among the 500 new agencies that arrived in 
Sri Lanka, about 100 agencies had developed 
housing components into their programs and induced 
exceptional competition for participation. In the 
context of strong motives for fundraising, exclusion of 
other INGOs in recovery work gives the position of 
advantage. So it hampered voluntary coordination 
among INGOs. Eventually, INGOs lost the chance to 
enhance payoff by issuing a credible threat to the 
government. 
According to game theory, credibility in threats can 
be introduced by a change of players (Shin, 2002). 
For instance, cooperative systems among INGOs in 
the housing field could be the solution to introduce 
credibility by changing the players in negotiation with 
the government. As a unified player, they could 
pursue maximizing the payoff for INGOs. Moreover 
they can contribute to enhancing effectiveness for 
advising an inexperienced government on 
policymaking immediately after disaster. 
5. ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS: WITHDRAWAL OF 
PROJECTS 
INGOs’ temporary or permanent withdrawal is 
another decision that hampered long-term outcomes 
in housing. It gradually occurred between the 
introduction of the buffer zone in January 2005 and 
the announcement of a new housing policy in May 
2006. Before the analysis of motives on this decision, 
context changes induced by previous decisions 
should be considered above all because they 
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changed internal motives as well as external 
contexts. 
5.1. Motives and Related Goals  
5.1.1. Change in Context 
Regarding changes in external context, first of all, 
lack of feasibility in the initial relocation plan was 
revealed. Assessment of coastal hazards and 
tsunami impacts revealed inappropriateness in the 
initial relocation criteria (Samaranayake, 2007). A 
lack of suitable land for relocation became the direct 
cause for policy revision (IFRC, 2006). Moreover, 
another earthquake of magnitude 8.6 in March 2005, 
which was not accompanied by tsunami, raised a 
question on objectives of a buffer zone (Hyndman, 
2009). 
Secondly, resumed civil war in December 2005 
hampered progress of recovery projects. Distorted 
relief resource distribution by political consideration 
worsened the socioeconomic disparities and led to 
ethnic conflict, which caused delay of recovery in the 
North and East areas (Ingram et al. 2006). 
Thirdly, a new president was elected in November 
2005 based on worsen disparities during recovery. 
The new president quickly distanced himself from the 
previous presidency by changing his predecessor’s 
government tsunami response body. Then, he 
announced in February 2006 that the buffer zone 
would be relaxed and the setback standards of the 
Costal Zone Management Plan of 1997 would be 
revived. (The Sunday Times, 2006, as cited in 
Hyndman, 2009) 
5.1.2. Government of Sri Lanka 
While the Sri Lankan government was not a decision-
maker of the project withdrawal, its revision of the 
relocation policy the INGOs’ decision. The relocation 
policy revision can be considered by complex 
motives. 
The most significant change in motive, vulnerability 
reduction, was that the government started to take 
various aspects of vulnerability into account based on 
scientific assessment and revealed limitations in 
relocation. Assessment of socioeconomic impacts by 
relocation served as momentum to reconsider the 
guidelines for development in the coastal zone 
(Samaranayake, 2007). 
Secondly, the motive, matching electorates’ 
expectations led to policy change based on 
accumulated limitations of the previous plan. The 
new regime had strong motive to solve the 
accumulated problems in recovery. The Revised 
Tsunami Housing Policy that expanded housing 
support from 98,525 to 120,000 in May 2006 can be 
understood as the intention to match electorates’ 
expectations (RADA, 2006). The government put this 
motive above vulnerability reduction because, after 
the revision of relocation criteria, the government 
gave people the chance to decide whether to 
relocate or not. 
On the other hand, change of relocation criteria was 
not consistent with the motive for effective resource 
utilization because it can interrupt ongoing projects 
with funds. At that time, the government suffered 
from budget constraints even to provide infrastructure 
at relocation sites (Belgian Red Cross (CRB), 2009). 
Nevertheless, the relocation policy was revised. It 
shows that the government put the other two motives 
before effective resource utilization. 
The priority among motives of the government can 
be defined, in order, as: matching electorates’ 
expectations, vulnerability reduction, and effective 
resource utilization. 
5.1.3. International NGOs 
Regarding the motive, matching donors’ 
expectations, after confirming the participation in 
reconstruction, the goal was changed from 
participation itself to making the project’s outcomes. 
For instance, Red Cross partners were under 
increasing pressure from donors and the media to 
demonstrate their use of resources (IFRC, 2007). 
When it is considered to make visible outcomes in 
housing, the reconstruction project should be kept. 
On the other hand, the motive that became the direct 
reason for project withdrawal was effective resource 
utilization. Because the characteristics of housing 
reconstruction required a long investment, it was 
hard to collect investment once the project was 
stopped, meaning that stopping the investment could 
have been the best strategy for INGOs when there 
was the possibility of project cancellation by the 
government. It also corresponds with the survey 
result on INGOs that NGOs focus primarily on short-
term accountability (Ebrahim, 2003). 
Another motive related to project withdrawal was 
vulnerability reduction. The resumed conflict had shift 
the attention of INGOs from tsunami recovery to the 
emerging internally displaced people crisis (IFRC, 
2008). The 2005 Kashmir earthquake encouraged 
some INGOs to divert attention to the new flashpoint 
before they had completed their mission in Sri Lanka. 
Of the total pledge of US $3.1 billion, only US $1.7 
billion had been actually committed by 2007 (Silva, 
2009). Therefore, INGOs’ project withdrawal was the 
result of both motives to prevent waste of budget and 
to support new vulnerable people. Within these 
motives, vulnerability reduction can be considered as 
a high priority based on that additional criterion was 
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applied to find more vulnerable people during 
implementation. 
All things taken together, the priority among motives 
of INGOs can be defined, in order, as: vulnerability 
reduction, effective resource utilization, and matching 
donors expectations. 
5.2. Analysis of Interactive Decisions  
5.2.1. Evaluation of Possible Decisions 
 
The relationship between the government and 
INGOs can be represented by an extensive form 
game between two players. Five possible decision 
sets can be considered, like below. 
Decisions set: (INGO, Sri Lankan Government, 
INGO) 
1. (Progress project, Keep project,—) 
2. (Progress project, Stop project,—) 
3. (Hold on project, Keep project, Resume) 
4. (Hold on project, Keep project, Stop) 
5. (Hold on project, Stop project,—) 
Each decision set can be evaluated according to 
motives of the government. First of all, in terms of 
matching electorates’ expectations, two goals can be 
defined as “quick progress of recovery” and 
“capability to proceed recovery continuously.” Based 
on “quick progress,” preferences are decided as 
(a)>(c)>(b)>(e)>(d). According to “capability to 
proceed recovery,” preferences can be defined as 
(a)>(c)=(e)>(b)>(d). Secondly, regarding vulnerability 
reduction focusing on “reduce socioeconomic impact 
by unnecessary relocation,” the order of decision is 
(a)=(c)>(e)>(d)>(b). Thirdly, for “effective resource 
utilization” focusing on keeping the recovery budget 
by aid, preference is decided as (a)=(c)>(b)=(e)>(d). 
Therefore, the government’s preference order of 
decision sets is decided as (a)>(c)>(e)>(b)>(d). 
INGOs’ preferences can be determined as well. For 
vulnerability reduction focusing on helping the most 
vulnerable people, the order is decided as 
(c)>(d)=(e)>(a)>(b). Secondly, according to effective 
resource utilization focusing on budget investment, 
preference is (c)>(a)>(d)=(e)>(b). Finally, for 
matching donors’ expectations focusing on 
undertaking recovery work, preference is decided as 
(a)>(c)>(e)>(d)>(b). When put together, INGOs’ 
preference is in order of (c)>(d)>(a)>(e)>(b). 
5.2.2. Analysis of Strategies 
Government and INGOs sequentially made decisions 
on the progress of housing reconstruction project at 
the   relocation   site.    This   relationship    can   be  
Figure 2. Extensive form game in decisions on withdrawal of 
projects 
represented by extensive form game between two 
players, like Figure 2. 
In the viewpoint of INGOs, the decision to keep the 
project on was the dominant strategy that gives higher 
payoff regardless of the government’s decisions. 
Even though it induces delay of the recovery process, 
temporary withdrawal of INGOs was a reasonable 
decision to maximize their own payoff. 
For INGOs, it is important to keep the motive for 
continuous investment during long-term recovery. 
However, in housing reconstruction, uncertainty in 
changing relocation criteria lowered the expected 
payoff from further investment. Moreover, in terms 
of INGOs’ goal to support the most vulnerable 
people, the government’s beneficiaries selection 
was inconsistent with INGOs’ criteria. On the other 
hand, another chance to help vulnerable people in 
the resumed civil war or another international 
disaster became the reason why many INGOs 
decided to divert the housing projects’ budgets to 
other works. 
5.2.3. Conditions to Shift Decisions 
The key issue for sustainability of long-term 
recovery processes can be how to motivate INGOs 
to maintain their investment for recovery. 
First of all, as a normative solution for INGOs’ 
withdrawal during implementation of long-term 
recovery project, commitment of INGOs for local 
development is considered. However, for long-term 
recovery, like housing and infrastructure, INGOs’ 
motive to keep their investment was influenced by 
the government’s recovery policy that could define 
INGOs’ expected payoff. Without a proper policy 
that could meet the motive of INGOs to support 
vulnerable people, INGOs would consider diverting 
the budget to other fields or disaster cases to 
maximize their motive. 
Measures to enhance INGOs’ payoff by keeping 
their investment in long-term projects had to be 
considered as a motive-compatible solution. One of 
the factors influencing expected payoff was 
uncertainty in policy revision. The government did 
not share information on how much the buffer zone 
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would be reduced with people and INGOs, and such 
uncertainty decreased INGOs’ payoff from 
persisting in the housing project. It became a 
fundamental reason for withdrawal of INGOs from 
the housing projects. As a measure to reduce 
uncertainty in long-term recovery, the government 
could consider allowing INGOs to participate in 
policymaking processes or share information with 
INGOs. INGOs’ participation in recovery 
policymaking can reduce the uncertainty of policy 
revision and increase the expected payoff in long-
term investment by reflecting their own criteria in 
planning. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The long-term recovery process was analyzed by 
various stakeholders’ motives and their conflicts in 
an interactive decision-making process. The 
conditions for improvement of long-term recovery 
output were suggested in terms of motive 
compatibility. As a case study, the recovery process 
of Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami was analyzed. 
Two key decisions for limited achievement of long-
term recovery goals were defined. 
Firstly, the Sri Lankan government’s hasty 
introduction of uniform distance relocation was the 
result of complex conditions and motives including 
their own political conflict, lack of relocation 
experience, and INGOs’ competition for recovery 
participation. A normative solution for changing the 
direct motive for decision, like supplementation of 
experience, can be an impractical solution because 
of the low frequency of large-scale disasters. When 
the interactive decision among players is 
considered, improving the government’s initial 
recovery policy can be achieved by issuing a 
credible threat from INGOs. In Sri Lanka, the reason 
why INGOs could not make a credible threat was 
competition among INGOs over the capacity of 
coordination. A coordination system among INGOs 
in the housing field can be the solution to introduce 
credibility. 
Secondly, INGOs’ projects withdrawal was defined 
as decision induced by the delay of the whole 
recovery process in Sri Lanka. Such a decision was 
made based on motives and conditions, including 
accumulated limitation of uniform relocation plan, 
political regime change, and emergence of new 
vulnerable people. As a direct measure for motives 
of withdrawal, increasing commitment of INGOs for 
local society can be considered. But when it comes 
into conflict with other motives, like pursuing budget 
effectiveness and supporting vulnerable people, it 
cannot change the actual decision. As a motive- 
compatible solution, the Sri Lankan government can 
prevent INGOs’ from withdrawal during recovery by 
increasing INGOs’ expected payoff in long-term 
participation. It can be possible by involving INGOs 
in recovery policy-making. 
In terms of the recovery process, it was revealed 
that the failure in the initial phase had a lasting 
effect on players’ motives. For instance, the 
government’s exclusion of INGOs in the initial 
planning demotivated continuous participation in 
long-term recovery. It led to the decline in 
outcomes. Although the government had gradually 
widened their understanding of vulnerability and 
expanded consultation with INGOs in decision 
making, INGOs withdrawal was not prevented 
successfully. It shows the importance of the early 
planning phase for achieving a sustainable, long-
term recovery process. 
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